Articles by John Johns

Torture and National Security

By John H. Johns, BG, USA Ret.
May 18, 2007

The revelation of widespread torture of prisoners in Cuba, Iraq, and Afghanistan justifiably shocked the world community, including the American people. The stark photos of the degradation of the prisoners left little need for words to convey the implications for world opinion. The damage to our moral standing in the world - and support for our "war against terrorism" - was profound. Karl Rove was reported to have said that it would take generations to overcome the damage to our moral standing in the world. Polls showed that the American public shared the outrage of this moral breakdown and violation of the values we present to the world in our effort to promote human rights and dignity. A USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup Poll in May 2004 found that 54% of those surveyed were bothered a "great deal" by these acts and 25% bothered a "fair amount." Only 9% were not bothered at all. Many members of Congress expressed "outrage" and promised to get at the bottom of the matter. President Bush and other senior members of the administration, including the chain of command in the military, echoed this outrage and also promised a full accounting. Reflecting the small minority that was "not bothered," a few members of Congress expressed "outrage over the outrage" expressed by the majority.

Subsequent disclosures revealed a great deal of hypocrisy on the part of those senior officials who expressed shock and outrage over the torture practices. In a series of memos written by members of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice, culminating with a 42-page memo on 9 January 2002, there was a deliberate effort to justify "techniques of interrogation" that would yield more timely and valid intelligence in our war on the terrorists. The White House and the Defense Department endorsed the substance of the Justice memos. The entire process, from the Department of Justice to the senior officials in the field, circumvented international protocols as well as federal laws on the treatment of prisoners; in essence we waived the Geneva Conventions. According to Justice lawyers, the "war on terrorism" was an exception to the rule and justified new rules. Although the State Department reportedly objected to these decisions, President Bush rejected their rebuttal. Several members of the military legal team reportedly dissented, but were overruled. From what has been made public, no senior member of the military chain of command objected to the policy that was, in effect, suspending the international laws against torture of prisoners.

During the past year, several studies, all under the auspices of the Department of Defense, have purported to get to the bottom of the matter. All have exonerated from accountability most except low-ranking soldiers. Trials have been held for several of these, with some still in progress and more to come. Other than the reduction in rank of a reserve brigadier general, no other senior officer has been held accountable. These actions have no face credibility, as many have pointed out in the media and in Congress. Whether the leaders in Congress will act to establish accountability remains to be seen. According to the latest polls, there will be less public pressure for them to do so. A USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup Poll released in early May 2005 shows a diminution of public condemnation of the torture. According to this latest survey, the number of those bothered a "great deal" by the acts has dropped to 39%. Those bothered "not at all" rose to 19%.

Taken together, the facts cited above should cause concern in several areas. It is well established that military members have a duty to refuse to obey illegal policies and orders and this certainly applies to actions that violate the Geneva rules in regard to the treatment of prisoners. Thus, one can argue that the punishments now being meted out to those junior soldiers are justified. We punished hundreds of soldiers and Marines for atrocities in Vietnam, even though many of these acts were committed in the heat of battle where it was difficult to distinguish between innocent civilians and insurgents bent on killing those who committed the atrocities. But to dismiss the role of the systemic climate established by the policy documents described above, and the apparent acquiescence by the chain of command, defies explanation. When policy documents waive international laws, the people on the ground have the burden to reject that policy. In my view, the behavior of these senior officials represents more serious violations than those at the end of the process. To exonerate them is inexcusable.

A more fundamental and profound consequence of this episode is what it has done, and can do, to the moral fiber of the military. Perhaps the firewall constructed by limiting the blame to low-ranking enlisted personnel, will satisfy the conscience of the rank and file of the military and reinforce a dedication to moral behavior necessary for a professional military. This was the approach used in dealing with the My Lai massacre in Vietnam. The success of that approach, as it applied to My Lai, and the current problem is debatable. Years after that event, LTG Ray Peers, who had conducted the investigation of the My Lai atrocity, wrote to the Army Chief of Staff that the systemic problems in the Army that led to the My Lai incident had not been corrected. The Army Chief of Staff then ordered an extensive educational process to strengthen ethical behavior. What seems certain in the current situation is that if the military officer corps refuses to own what has occurred and learn from it, we will have weakened the moral fiber of the military. Claiming that it was the behavior of a "few rogue bad apples" will blind the military to what has occurred. One of the lessons learned should be the need to strengthen the willingness to give loyal dissent to policies that violate the moral code of the professional military. Surely there were senior officers, other than the military lawyers in the Pentagon, who objected to the policies. If those in the chain of command agreed with, rather than just acquiesced to, these policies, there are more fundamental problems than lack of moral courage to dissent.

There are also serious concerns at the societal level. The polls cited above show that the justifiable public outrage is waning. It is likely that some of this is a result of the acceptance of the rationalization that this whole affair was the behavior of those few bad apples. This is an understandable reaction; it is comforting to believe that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with our military leadership and our societal values and moral fiber. This kind of rationalization has worked for many societies, including those in Germany who had "no idea" of what was going on in the concentration camps. Fortunately, the German leaders after the war faced up to the realities of what had happened to the German people and took steps to educate the people so that the Holocaust would not reoccur. If we are not careful, the legitimate outrage at torture will disappear and we will avoid addressing the underlying causes of this blot on our moral fiber. Now that the election is over and there is no partisan political rationale to use the matter in a partisan way, we should be able to look at the problem in an honest manner. This will be a delicate task. At a minimum, Congress should be more responsible in its oversight responsibility.

The most critical aspect of this scandal, especially in terms of immediate implications for our national security, has to do with the international community. The conduct of torture itself, and the way we have handled it, has the potential for long-term damage to our war against those who are using terrorism as their primary means of violence. Terrorism is not new; nations as well as non-state actors have used it. When used by non-state groups such as those now confronting us, those groups depend on at least tacit support of societies in which they operate. That support depends in large part on how those groups are perceived in regard to the justness of their cause, and that of the adversaries, rather than the acts of terrorism themselves. In this sense, the war against terrorism is a war of ideas, with emphasis on who holds the moral high ground. From all accounts, we have been losing this war and the torture of prisoners was, and continues to be, a significant factor. How the international community perceives our reaction to it is critical in this war of ideas. For reasons stated above, we do not believe the approaches we have taken to date will persuade that audience that we have owned up to the actions. In short, blaming it on a few is not credible. "Out sourcing" prisoner interrogation to countries who can do the torture is a thinly veiled solution.

The fundamental flaw in this episode, it seems to me, is the clear disdain of this administration for international norms of conduct. Unless our body politic, including the public, develops a greater respect for responsible membership in the international community, we will find it difficult to regain the moral high ground. Without that moral status, the war on terrorism will be unsuccessful. The rules regarding torture, like other international protocols, are a set of generalized principles and norms designed to serve the interests of the entire world community. At times, conforming to these rules may cause inconveniences. To dismiss them in a cavalier manner, as we did in this instance, is a breach of trust. Trust is a precious commodity, hard to earn, easily squandered, and when lost, very difficult to regain. We have an uphill battle on this issue.

Every country reserves the right to protect its national interests, especially its physical security, even if it entails the violation of international norms. Flouting these norms, however, should be rare and only after carefully weighing the costs. The documents cited above justified the waiver of the rules on torture using that rationale. That rationale is debatable, and I believe, invalid. Experts in the art of interrogation differ on the efficacy of torture as a means of gaining valid intelligence. It is logical to assume that in specific cases, it is effective. These specific cases of success must be weighed against the costs of such techniques. In the current instance, the evidence seems to be that torture was rather indiscriminate. The consequences in terms of the worldwide reaction and the damage done to our moral standing are incalculable.

We must take every reasonable measure we can to undo the damage of the torture issue. A necessary step is for Congress to demand a full accounting that is credible not only to the military and the American public, but to the world community as well. The so-called investigations to date show beyond question that the Department of Defense cannot be trusted to give a credible account. There must be a bi-partisan panel on the level of the 9-11 Commission to perform that task. In addition to establishing accountability, it must articulate corrective measures to correct the systemic flaws that permitted this to happen. The purpose of this effort should not be to punish individuals; rather, it should be to identify features of our bureaucratic culture that permitted this to happen. Otherwise, I believe there will be a tendency to rationalize the conduct as an aberration of a "few bad apples," as seems to be occurring. That can have disastrous consequences.

Counterinsurgency Operations: Mission Impossible

By John H. Johns, BG, USA Ret.
March 16, 2007

Much of the current debate on what went wrong in Iraq is focused on tactical errors, deficiencies in military force structure and training, and errors made by the "Coalition Provisional Authority." The Army has revised its COIN doctrine and has swung the pendulum back toward configuring the force for this kind of warfare. This is a mistake; the kinds of wars we have fought in Vietnam and Iraq cannot be won by U.S. combat forces.

The most recent strategy for "winning" Iraq is to "surge" military strength in key areas so that we can turn the "hold and build" function over to the Iraqi forces. This is reminiscent of the mid-60s plan to "pacify" Vietnam before turning the counterinsurgency effort over to the Vietnamese. This strategy was developed in the 1965 Army study "Pacification, Republic of Vietnam" (PROVN), which recommended that we deploy combat units to "pacify" the country and then turn it over to the Vietnamese. Recognizing that the central problem was political, the study emphasized nation-building as an essential component of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

General Harold K. Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, ordered a series of staff studies and personnel actions to implement the recommendations of the PROVN study. Three major staff studies in 1967-68 had similar themes. They emphasized that these kinds of conflict were first and foremost political battles that competed for the loyalties of the people. A central goal of COIN operations was to shrink the human sea supportive of the insurgents. While security for the people is essential, military force must avoid over reaction that will alienate the people. The studies argued against the use of U.S. combat forces to conduct COIN. This was one of the few recommendations rejected by General Johnson. Rather, the studies said, emphasis should be on the use of highly skilled advisors knowledgeable of the culture and nation-building techniques. Military and police functions should be done by indigenous forces.

The first study, Psyop-Reason, called for a military cadre of "social engineers" who knew how to build institutions and a sense of nationhood among the people to give legitimacy to the government. The Army leadership initially rejected the recommendations for such personnel, stating that such activities should be left to U.S. civilian agencies such as State, AID, and USIA. After the two succeeding studies, the Secretary of the Army accepted the notion, but directed that the studies be kept within the Army to avoid a turf war with civilian agencies. The new Civil Affairs doctrine set forth in FM 41-10 (1967) warned our "nation-builders" to avoid trying to make other nations in our own image, either politically, economic, or social.

A new career field termed "Overseas Security Operations" (Later changed to "Military Advisor Officer Program," (MAOP)) was created to prepare officers as "experts" in COIN operations. This new career field rolled up the Foreign Area Specialist Training (FAST) program with nation-building skills so that these officers could provide the necessary skills as advisors to U.S. commanders and indigenous officials. Most of these officers were to be reservists, available to augment active forces depending on the area of operations. General Johnson had envisioned this program to have about 6,000 members, but this never reached fruition.

In spite of these measures to enhance the military's COIN capabilities, the Vietnam effort failed. While many factors went into this failure, the pattern of events has a remarkable resemblance to those occurring in Iraq. We were unable to form an indigenous government to our satisfaction, the indigenous forces lacked the motivation to "stand up," and tactical victories failed to change the strategic goal of forming a "free and stable government." Some argue that we lost only because we lost our political will and suspended funding for Vietnam. Most reject that conclusion.

There were numerous historical examples to warn against this venture. The French had failed in their effort to maintain their Indo-China colonial empire and later failed in Algeria. The British faced insurgencies in their colonies and resolved most of them through diplomacy. The COIN war in Malaysia is often cited as a success, but most analysts recognize a basic difference in this case study when applied to the American intervention in Vietnam. The British were well established in Malaysia, most of the COIN forces were indigenous, andthe insurgents were an ethnic minority.

The bitter experience in Iraq has once again opened the debate about the wisdom of the post-Vietnam policy of configuring and training forces for conventional warfare at the expense of a COIN capability. Critics of that "conventional war" emphasis argue that military strategy, and force structure and training to execute that strategy, should emphasize the most likely employment of force in the 21st century-counterinsurgency. Much of the criticism has focused on how the military has forgotten the "lessons" of Vietnam and other counterinsurgency operations of the past in its conduct of the war in Iraq. The general consensus seems to be that the Iraq venture has failed because of the execution rather than national security strategy that led to the decision to go to war.

Contrary to the argument that the problems in Iraq are due to poor execution, the evidence is overwhelming that wars such as Vietnam and Iraq, where there is a broad-based, highly motivated indigenous insurgency, cannot be won by foreign military forces regardless of their structure, training, and size-due to several factors.

The nature of modern insurgencies presents various obstacles for successful COIN conducted by foreign combat units. Whether the combat be in rural or urban areas, insurgents operate by embedding themselves in the "human sea." It is impossible to use force without some "collateral damage" to innocent people, including women and children. Such damage is not easily swept aside by explanations of good intentions. The extensive use of artillery, bombs, and other high tech weapons increases the collateral damage.

In addition to the unintentional collateral damage, there will be atrocities regardless of how well the troops are trained and led. The frustration from seeing one's comrades led into ambushes or passively allowing such can eat at discipline. Such events have been well-documented for Vietnam and Iraq. There were hundreds of convictions of U.S. military personnel in the Vietnam War and this does not include the assassinations under the Phoenix program and the uncounted number of innocents killed in "free fire zones." I am not placing a moral judgment on the military who commit the latter atrocities because they are sanctioned by policy. As noted below, however, they will become known throughout the world.

In all the various Army studies of the Vietnam era cited above, the use of torture was condemned. It occurred in Vietnam, but it was against doctrine. The revelation of widespread torture of prisoners in Cuba, Iraq, and Afghanistan justifiably shocked the world community, including the American people. The stark photos of the degradation of the prisoners left little need for words to convey the implications for world opinion. The damage to our moral standing in the world-and support for our "war against terrorism"-was profound. Evidence that the policy was approved in the White House has exacerbated the damage.

An essential condition for fighting wars is the support of the American public. Support is difficult to obtain for the long term unless there is a "clear and present danger." The original rationale for the Vietnam war was that it was necessary to halt the spread of Communism; there would be a domino effect if we did not draw the line in Vietnam. This rather vague threat was enhanced by the "Tonkin Gulf" incident. Evidence shows that this was a ruse, but it was used successfully to get a congressional resolution to send in combat units. The scare tactics of the WMD ("mushroom clouds over Manhattan") and Al Qaeda ties were similarly used by President Bush to rally support for the Iraq War. When wars are prolonged and costly, it is difficult to maintain public support, particularly if the stated threat appears to be bogus.

Historically, criticism of foreign policy, especially during wartime, was supposed to stop at the water's edge. Support of foreign policy by members of Congress was a patriotic duty once a decision had been made through the interaction of Congress and the Executive Branch. We also expected the media to support policy when it involved war. Public criticism by senior military officers, active or retired, was taboo. For these conditions to hold, the administration conducting the war must have credibility; the Bush administration has lost that credibility.

Modern communication techniques assure that collateral damage, atrocities, and torture will be known throughout the world, undermining our moral stature, one of the most unappreciated components of national power. One can rail against the media for exposing these acts; this is a moot point-the media will publicize them! A democracy can function only if the public is informed.

COIN operations have little chance of success if the U.S. role is perceived to be to further imperial hegemony (Colonialism Lite?). While it is natural to expect that we will support regimes that further our national interests, our current national security strategy invites skepticism about the purity of our motives. Underlying this strategy is the assumption that we have universal economic and political values that the world wants, and that we have a moral obligation to remake the world in our image. This does not provide a sound basis for COIN operations in many parts of the world.

In the final analysis, success in these kinds of military operations must be measured by their impact on the overall security of the United States. Both the Vietnam and Iraqi Wars have been counterproductive to our national interests. There is almost unanimous agreement that the Iraq war has seriously damaged our war on terrorism and has eroded our stature in international affairs. The near universal sympathy after 9-11 quickly dissipated after our invasion of Iraq. Along with the perception by most of the world of our one-sided support of Israel, the Iraq War is cited as the principal reasons for animosity to the U.S. role in international affairs.

The world-wide network of terrorists, like the insurgents fighting COIN forces, depends on a friendly sea of supporters. We cannot win that war unless we shrink that sea. In this war of ideas, we are losing badly. The Iraq War has flooded that sea, pushing millions into the support base of the terrorists as well as furnishing recruits for their ranks. "Winning" cannot be defined solely by what happens inside Iraq; it must include the broader context of national security.

The central lesson for the American people and our military leaders is: don't let our political leaders put our military forces in this kind of situation again. If there are circumstance where genuine national interests dictate that we help a country put down an insurgency, then do it with advisory teams of highly skilled advisors. The Pentagon leadership needs to avoid swinging the pendulum back too far in configuring our forces to perform a constabulary function.

Media Exposure of Military Misdeeds

By John H. Johns June 17, 2005

National Will in Wartime

The national dialogue on the Newsweek report of desecration of the Koran has been quite emotional with many intemperate comments. It follows the exposure of widespread misconduct in the treatment of prisoners of war, including the documented Abu Ghraib events and the pictures of Saddam Hussein in his under garments. While Newsweek has retracted its claim, the Pentagon has acknowledged, "mishandling of the Koran."

Much of the commentary, especially from administration spokes people, has been disingenuous at best and borders on self-righteous hypocrisy. This is unfortunate, because the issue transcends the specific subject of the Koran and how Newsweek handled it. The tendency to blame the media for undermining national will is a red herring and ignores the real issue. The focus should be on loyal dissent in Wartime - not just by the media, but Congress and the military as well.

Historically, criticism of foreign policy, especially during wartime, was supposed to stop at the water's edge. Support of foreign policy by members of Congress was a patriotic duty once a decision had been made through the interaction of Congress and the Executive Branch. We also expected the media to support policy when it involved war. Public criticism by senior military officers, active or retired, was taboo.

Obviously, national will and cohesion are necessary for successful execution of wars. In fact, the show of national unity is an essential element in diplomatic negotiations to prevent war. Potential adversaries must perceive a credible willingness to use force if peaceful means are to be successful. Thus, a unified front is essential. In a democracy, such a unified effort can only be achieved by convincing the public of the necessity of war.

The quest for bipartisan support in wartime is more likely to be achievable when the policies and wars are based on a "clear and present danger" as the rationale. Try as they may in wars since WWII, this ideal has been elusive for each of the administrations involved. The Vietnam conflict was the most difficult in this regard. Clearly, public criticism of policy by influential people such as elected officials, senior military officers, and the media can undermine the support necessary for successful execution of foreign policy, especially wars.

On the other hand, stifling criticism is unacceptable in a democracy. The central issue, it seems to me, is to know the difference between loyal dissent and irresponsible, destructive criticism.

My Country, Right or Wrong

In April 1816 naval commander Stephen Decatur toasted his victory over the Barbary pirates with these words: "Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations, may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong." Carl Schurz, who was a Major General in the Union Army and was later elected to the Senate, revised the Quote in a speech to the Senate. His version is, "Our country, right or wrong. When right, it ought be kept right; when wrong, to be put right." Senator Schurz had it more correct for a democracy than did Decatur.

The problem comes when a large segment of the nation perceives that "things are wrong and need to be put right." When and how does one go about putting things right without undermining national will and unity in general and more specifically without harming military morale of those fighting? When is it appropriate for influential members of the country to criticize policy publicly during wartime, and who judges the limits of this criticism? As I will argue below, the current policies in general, and the Iraq War in particular, dictate "putting things right." In looking at the limits of such criticism, I will examine the three national institutions mentioned above-Congress, the military, and the media.

Vietnam as Prologue

The Vietnam War should have taught us some lessons that put the current debate in perspective. During WWII, there was little public criticism by members of Congress and the media. There was none by senior members of the military. There was more criticism during the Korean conflict, and one senior military officer (MacArthur) went public while in uniform and after retirement.

Public dissent by members of Congress and the media increased dramatically during the Vietnam conflict, as will be detailed below. However, with a few exceptions, the military community, active and retired, remained silent. The difference between WWII and the latter two wars can be partially explained by the lack of a "clear and present danger" in the latter cases. In the case of the Vietnam conflict, however, part of the problem stemmed from the manner in which the people were persuaded to support the war.

It is fair to say that there was a great deal of deception by the Johnson administration, in particular the "Tonkin Gulf" incident, in getting congressional support for the war. In an effort to create a "clear and present danger," the public was told that if we didn't stop communism in Asia we would find them on the California coast. Claims of "light at the end of the tunnel" were used to maintain support over the years. It is also fair to say that the public was kept in the dark on many other matters of the war, not the least of which was manipulation of the budget to have both "guns and butter."

One of the best accounts of the deceptive practices of the Johnson administration can be found in H.R. McMaster's 1995 book, Dereliction of Duty. The subtitle, "Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam," suggests the major conclusion of the book-the nation was deceived into going to war and misled as to the progress of the effort. McMaster accuses the top officials, both civilian and uniformed, of failing to protest wrong policies that needed to be put right.

These deceptive actions by the Johnson administration wore thin over the years as the costs in lives and dollars became evident. The public turned against the war and eventually Johnson lost the presidency because of his duplicity. It took years for the military, especially the Army, to recover from the damage to it as an institution and the public's trust in it. "The Vietnam Syndrome" also affected the public's willingness to support an aggressive foreign policy that relied on a credible threat to use force. The American people had lost trust and confidence in their government, including the military.

A few influential people had spoken out early against the Vietnam War, but they were in a distinct minority. Senator William Fulbright and Representative Pete McCloskey were outspoken critics of the war early on, but most politicians hid their reservations for fear of being branded "soft on communism," and failure to "support the troops".

While there were pockets of dissent in the media, it was only after Walter Cronkite announced in early 1968 that the war was "unwinnable" that the full force of the media made an impact. LBJ is reported to have said, "If I have lost Uncle Walter, we have lost the war." Shortly thereafter, Johnson announced that he would not be a candidate for re-election.

The military community had few public dissenters during this period. In 1971 Daniel Ellsberg, a former Marine and member of a highly classified study group, leaked what became known as the Pentagon Papers, which revealed official assessments that contradicted public statements of the administration. In the same year, ex-Navy Lieutenant John Kerry made allegations of widespread atrocities in Vietnam (A search of the National Archives will validate Kerry's allegations). Did the activities of Daniel Ellsberg and John Kerry in 1971 erode national will? Of course they did. A few respected leaders such as retired General David Shoup, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, also spoke out against the war (in the late sixties). They believed the policy was wrong and needed to be "put right."

Would it have been better for these events to be hidden from the public? Would it have been better if Walter Cronkite had suppressed his analysis and continued to report a rosy picture of the war? Would it have been better if Daniel Ellsberg had not revealed the secret study that questioned the war and contradicted the official version of events? The answer to those questions requires assumptions as to the role of public dissent in general, and the media in particular, in a democratic society during wartime.

If more prestigious people had spoken out against the Vietnam policy earlier, perhaps thousands of lives could have been saved. On the other hand, one could make the case that such public criticism was at best unpatriotic and perhaps treasonous. They certainly gave aid and comfort to the enemy and eroded national will. Would it have served the national interest to keep this information from the public? Many people hold that view and argue that we could have won the war absent these critics, especially the media. After all, there was extensive censorship and manipulation of the media during WW II. Bad news from the battlefield was deliberately held back while government propaganda was designed to boost morale. Few can criticize those measures.

The Watergate scandal, which has recently been resurrected with the identification of "Deep Throat," further eroded trust and confidence in the government in the 1970s. Once again, it was investigative reporting that exposed the unconstitutional actions of President Nixon and other high-level officials. As was the case with the Pentagon Papers, a "whistleblower" aided the media in exposing the crime. As was also the case with Ellsberg and Kerry, many label Mark Felt a traitor and a large segment of the public denounces such betrayal of confidence. Nixon's tapes reflect this attitude. In a tape of a conversation with John Dean, Nixon commented "...the informer is not wanted in our society...either way, that's the one thing people do sort of line up against...everybody, would treat him as a pariah..." Unfortunately, Nixon was correct - the public does not condone "ratfinks" - unless it supports their cause.

Congressional Dissent Many will argue that the only legitimate dissent in wartime should be within the confines of the political process. Narrowly defined, this could be interpreted to go something like this: The Constitution establishes a process for going to war. The president is given authority to provide national security, but only Congress can declare war. This is a murky area and recent conflicts have been "undeclared," with congressional approval expressed through war power "resolutions." Let us assume that this conforms to the intent of the Constitution (The Supreme Court has not been asked to rule on its constitutionality). The people elect their government representatives. Those people debate the issues and decide on policy. Once this policy is decided, all should get behind the effort and cease public criticism. This applies especially to the Congress and the military. Otherwise, it is difficult, if not impossible, to prosecute a war. Not only does public dissent weaken national will and hurt military morale, it gives aid and comfort to the enemy.

In ideal circumstances, that argument is valid. Unfortunately, current circumstances regarding our foreign policy in general, and the Iraq War in particular, are not ideal. The shock of 9-11 changed the political process significantly.

The 9-11 shock aroused the public to a "clear and present danger" - terrorism was brought to our homeland in a stark manner. We circled the wagons and for some time had national unity - and the sympathy and support of the world community. Congress and the American public overwhelmingly supported the president in his response to this danger. In effect, Congress and the American people gave President Bush complete authority to do what he thought best to protect the nation. The decision to go into Afghanistan received domestic and international approval, to include UN approval.

When the president convinced the American public that Iraq represented the front line of terrorism, the American people supported the decision (78%) to go to war in Iraq. Not only did President Bush convince the American people that Iraq had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that were an immediate threat, he also convinced them that Iraq had a direct link to Osama bin Laden and the 9-11 attack. The public perceived a "clear and present danger."

In a show of unity, the American people, and their elected representatives, gave Bush free reign to use whatever force he deemed appropriate against Iraq. Congress passed a resolution authorizing the use of force, contingent on certain circumstances. If one reads the resolution carefully, it is evident that the resolution was designed to strengthen President Bush's bargaining power to use diplomatic means to force Saddam to allow UN inspectors into Iraq. Congress trusted Bush to use the power in a responsible manner.

The resolution also bolstered President Bush's power to persuade the UN to put pressure on Iraq. Neither the congressional resolution nor the subsequent UN resolution authorized the use of force absent the specified contingencies - in essence, a material breach of the agreement to allow inspectors to verify that no WMDs existed.

The congressional resolution must be interpreted in the context of the political climate at the time. First of all, it was based on trust in Bush that his claims regarding the WMDs and the Al Qaeda connections were true. Secondly, at least many who voted for the resolution trusted Bush to use force only as a last resort. While many had serious reservation about giving Bush such support, there was incredible political pressure on individual members to show that they were "tough on the war on terrorism."

As events unfolded, many came to believe Congress, the public, and the world community had been deceived about the rationale for going to war in Iraq. WMDs were not found and the links to bin Laden didn't exist; in fact, the evidence indicated Saddam Hussein and bin Laden were enemies. While the administration succeeded in convincing the majority of the American people that the Iraq war was an essential element of the war on terrorism regardless of the original rationale, it has not sold that view to the international community, or to many of us in this country.

Recent classified British documents provide strong evidence that there was deliberate deception on the part of the Bush administration to "cook the books" to justify going to war in Iraq. Moreover, some of those documents allege the decision to go to war was made in early 2002 and that the intelligence would be fitted to support that decision. In other words, the Bush strategy was based on deliberate deception and a breach of trust with Congress, the UN, and the American public. Is it patriotic to let these deceptions go unchallenged? I think not. This is wrong policy that must be put right.

It is very difficult for Congress to do its constitutional duty to "put things right" in the current political environment. This is due to several systemic forces in our body politic in addition to the fear associated with 9-11. The Republican campaign in the 2002 mid-term election was very successful in portraying several Democrats as "weak on the war against terrorism." This was a deliberate strategy coordinated by Karl Rove. The most egregious case was the defeat of a Vietnam War hero, Senator Max Clelland. Accusing Clelland of being soft on defense, his opponent ran ads juxtaposing pictures of Clelland and Saddam and bin Laden, suggesting Clelland was "soft on national security." That opponent, now Senator Chambliss, avoided service during the Vietnam War.

The congressional resolution to support President Bush came in the context of that 2002 campaign. It is still dangerous for an honest debate in Congress about our national security policy in general and the War in Iraq in particular. As one senator told me, any criticism of administration policy is seen as a failure to "support the troops."

The reluctance to challenge the aggressive foreign policy of the Bush administration in general and the Iraq War in particular is partly due to the jingoistic attitude among the American people and the knowledge that the American culture is now supportive of an aggressive use of military power. Andrew Bacevich describes this culture in his recent 2005 book, The New American Militarism. At the end of WWII, we were enamored with military power, but the Korean War tempered that fervor somewhat. The Vietnam War shattered it. Several groups, particularly the neo conservatives, were dedicated to reviving that culture and take it one step further - to use it to establish hegemony over the globe.

In the context of this culture, the public responds favorably to jingoistic rhetoric such as "he can run but he can't hide...you are either with us or against us...mission accomplished...bring 'em on." It is very difficult for an elected official to separate criticism of policy and support for the troops in this climate. Consequently, the normal political process is not working and it is difficult for Congress to "put wrong policy right" without being accused of "not supporting the troops." Are members of Congress merely "playing politics" when they criticize these policies?

Loyal dissent by military leaders

"Putting wrong policy right" presents a special dilemma for military officers, both active and retired. To adopt the original Decatur phrase suggests one should salute and cease to question policy, whether it is right or wrong. That is precisely the approach taken by the Germans and Japanese leaders in WWII. They made a credible plea that they were loyal military that carried out the government's policies. The Nuremberg trials rejected that argument and set an international norm against blind obedience to policy.

How does a professional military officer go about this task without public criticism that may weaken national will, give aid and comfort to the enemy, and damage troop morale? The answer is relatively simple for active duty officers - they provide loyal dissent in the decision-making process, and then salute and carry out the decision without hesitation. In rare occasions, whistle blowing is justified. If one can't execute policy because of moral qualms, he/she should resign.

The dilemma is hazier for retired military officers. Some have criticized people such as those mentioned above for speaking out against our current foreign policy in general and the Iraq War in particular. This criticism is similar to that leveled at dissenters during the Vietnam era. The implication is that such public dissent is unpatriotic at best and perhaps treasonous. Does this criticism argue that we should adhere to the Nazi model? If so, how do we "put things right" in a democratic society? Clearly, public dissent of this kind has the negative consequences listed above - it does weaken national will, give aid and comfort to the enemy, and hurt troop morale. But to deny dissent altogether is to create a totalitarian state.

In the current situation, should Generals Tony Zini, Joseph Hoar, Wesley Clark, Tony McPeak, and other senior retired military be condemned for publicly criticizing our current policies? One could also criticize Colin Powell for "leaking" to Bob Woodward and others his "real" position opposing the Iraq War. Democracy cannot exist if the public is not informed. Leaving the job to the administration, especially one that used subterfuge to garner support for the war, is to surrender control of public awareness and move us toward a totalitarian society. To remain silent would, in my opinion, betray their obligation to the American people.

Some of us retired military consider current national security policy in general, and the Iraq War in particular, to be tragic mistakes that need to be "put right." Most of us have refrained from public criticism for the simple reason that we hesitate to undermine national will and more importantly, hurt troop morale. Our military is doing an outstanding job doing what the public and their elected leaders have asked them to do. However, I'm not sure that refrain from public criticism of the policies is patriotism at its best. In fact, I salute those senior retired officers who have spoken out. Policy will be "put right" only through public awareness that it is wrong.

There is a fine line between patriotism (loyalty to one's nation when it is morally right), chauvinism (militant glorification of one's country; vainglorious patriotism; unreasoning attachment and bias towards one's nation) and jingoism (boasting of one's patriotism and favoring an aggressive foreign policy). Schurz's concept offers the formula for drawing this line. Those who adopt the creed of blindly following wrong policy fit the chauvinistic/jingoistic category.

True patriots make an effort to "put things right" when they conclude a policy is wrong. The nation will be divided on which terms to apply to each specific circumstance and it will be a controversial issue in wars that are not in response to a "clear and present danger." Even if there is a genuine danger, it is often difficult to generate national will that requires self-sacrifice if that danger is ill defined. Thus, leaders are tempted to manufacture a "clear and present danger," as many believe was done by the administration in gaining support for the Iraq War. Should this kind of subterfuge go unchallenged? I think not.

Some of us believe the public was aroused to support the Iraq War through deliberate subterfuge to create the "clear and present danger." The 9-11 attacks prepared the public for this subterfuge. Those of us who are of that persuasion believe the patriotic thing to do is "put things right." How best to do that is open to debate. I find this to be a real dilemma, even in the present case where I believe firmly that we need to "put it right." I reject absolutist models that relegate us to the Nazi model of no dissent. On the other hand, I am bothered by the effect of public dissent on troop morale. This dilemma is one of the prices of democracy. I prefer it to a totalitarian society.

Media responsibility in times of emergency

Viewing the media conduct in the broader context of wartime dissent, it is fair to ask if the media in general, and Newsweek in particular, can be accused of undermining our war on terrorism. Regardless of how one feels about the wisdom of our policies and the conduct of the war, we can all agree that it behooves us to present a united front to the enemy if we can do so in good conscience. Anything that undercuts that unity will give aid and comfort to the enemy. This was true in the Korean War and the Vietnam conflict. Did the exposure of the My Lai massacre give aid and comfort to the enemy and undermine our unity? Of course it did.

The media as watchdogs for democracy can be very irritating. This is especially true during periods of national emergency when national unity is critical for success. This is the price of a democratic society. To eliminate this freedom would turn us into a totalitarian state. I doubt that any thoughtful person would call for that. The problem then, is where to draw the line. Many Americans expressed little concern over the torture of prisoners when it was exposed. Some, including several senators, were "outraged at the outrage" over the incidents. Recent surveys show that fewer Americans are concerned now than when the events were exposed. Did the public disclosure hurt our efforts? Of course it did! Would we rather not know about such behavior?

As on other issues discussed by the public, the line each person draws on judging the media tends to reflect his or her philosophical orientation. For those who endorse the current policies and resent criticism of it, the line is sharply drawn; any criticism is tantamount to treason. One commentator asked that we remember that we are all at war against terrorism, implying that any criticism of our effort is unpatriotic. I submit the basic problem is that we loyal citizens differ among ourselves on the basic policy of the administration and the conduct of the war. Should we who are critics remain silent because it gives "aid and comfort to the enemy?" I am aware that many think precisely that.

One can make the case that the exposure of documents in the Department of Justice, the White House, and the Department of Defense - documents that revealed the policy regarding torture - did far more damage to our moral standing than did the Abu Ghraib photos and the Newsweek story on the Koran. Without the revelation of those policy documents the Pentagon might have been able to make a persuasive case that those specific events were the isolated actions of a "few bad apples." They have tried to do that anyway, but have not made a credible case. The media has done a credible job of exposing the attempt to cover up these actions.

A side issue is the validity of the Newsweek allegation concerning the Koran. As has been amply reported, this is not the first such allegation of the mishandling of the Koran at Guantanamo Bay. As reported in the Washington Post on 20 May 2005, the International Committee of the Red Cross said it had repeatedly expressed concerns to the U.S. government in 2002 and 2003 about allegations of the desecration of the Koran. Moreover, a Pentagon spokesman acknowledged they had received those reports and acknowledged cases of unintentional mishandling of the Koran. He went on to say a new inquiry into such allegations "would probably corroborate more cases."

Was Newsweek irresponsible in reporting a leak about desecration of the Koran? Reporters clearly have a responsibility to be accurate in their reporting. The Newsweek article was unique only in its assertion that an unnamed senior official said a recent investigation had confirmed the earlier allegations. Could it be that the "recent investigation" referred to in the Newsweek article be the one referred to by the Pentagon spokesman? In spite of some of the comments bashing Newsweek, especially from the administration, the jury seems to be out on the accuracy of the Newsweek article.

A more serious problem surrounding the Newsweek debate is what the reaction says about the credibility of the United States in these matters. As some have pointed out, we have had a pattern of deceptive activities that have undermined our credibility. Polls show that we are distrusted throughout the world, not just among the Islamic community. One of the subjects bantered around is our failure to use "psychological operations" to win "hearts and minds" and counter the negative perceptions of the United States. The implication is that negative world opinion is due to our failure to use the right techniques of persuasion. The Post's 20 May 2005 In The Loop column cites an Army colonel urging that responsibility for presenting the United States' point of view be moved from the State Department to the "Pentagon psy-war guys."

Moving the propaganda function from the State Department to the military suggests that will solve the problem. Having served a great deal of my military career in the field of Psychological Operations, I learned that at least two conditions must underlie a successful program: You need a saleable product and you must be credible. Some of us believe our current administration has neither of these essential conditions. The Pax Americana policy set forth in the 2002 National Security Strategy is not a saleable strategy to foreign audiences and the Iraq venture demonstrates that.

In regard to the media in general, the media has been far too lax in holding this administration's feet to the fire in regard to its duplicity. I agree with those who question the self-righteous attitude of the administration, given their record of false allegations that provided the rationale for going to war. There has been ample evidence that the so-called lapses in intelligence were engineered to support a decision already made to go to war.

With respect to the media's reporting of incidents that weaken the moral standing of the United States, e.g., the publicity on torture and the current Newsweek allegation, clearly this sort of reporting damages our standing in the world and gives aid and comfort to the enemy. Once again, Seymour Hersh, the reporter who publicly exposed the My Lai atrocities, has been the catalyst for exposing atrocities in Iraq. Some criticized him for both exposures. Recent release of pictures showing Saddam in his underwear has added fuel to the criticism of the conduct of guards supervising prisoners. Should the reporters who had this knowledge have suppressed it? To have done so would have violated their constitutional and moral duty to the American people.

One can argue that in the case of a "clear and present danger," as existed in WW II, suspension of freedom of the press is justified. Suspension of constitutional protections has occurred numerous times during periods of national emergency, beginning with the "Alien and Sedition Act" in the late 1790s. Lincoln suspended certain features of the Constitution during the Civil War and similar actions were taken in WW I and WW II. After each emergency was over, constitutional protections were restored.

Formal government legislation is only the extreme form of action to manage freedom of the media. Other measures include use of the powers of the White House to intimidate the media. All administrations have used this power, some more blatant than others. The Bush administration has been rather aggressive in this kind of manipulation, including the current bashing of Newsweek.

A longer-term strategy of intimidating the media is to brand it as "biased." Conservatives have been quite successful in their effort to label the media as "liberal" and therefore biased. Since the media in this country are businesses, they depend on the support of their audiences, and are therefore sensitive to such labeling. This is especially true of television. Conservatives have explicitly targeted CBS and the misadventure of Dan Rather during the last election cycle gave ammunition to the conservatives.

Summary

When a government uses deception to go to war, as LBJ did in the Vietnam conflict and Bush has done to gather support for the Iraq war, it is difficult to make a case for uncritical support for that venture when the going gets tough. Apparently the Bush administration believed the conflict would be short and sweet like the 1991 Gulf War. If indeed the "Mission Accomplished" boast had been valid, there is no doubt Bush would have been immune from criticism.

For reasons cited above, the Iraqi War can't be honestly debated in Congress; thus, we have no political mechanism for correcting misguided policy other than the administration's recognition of error. The administration has made it clear that it will not listen to private dissent of its policies. There is little likelihood that ideologues in the administration will ever admit error in the absence of public pressure, and there will be no public pressure if the public is kept in the dark.

I and many of my colleagues in the retired military community anguish over the duty to "support the troops" while disagreeing fundamentally with our foreign policy in general and the Iraqi War in particular. Many of us believe the Iraq War has nothing to do with the war on terrorism, except that it exacerbates it. How do we express our dissent without undermining the morale of those who are putting their lives on the line because they believe they are fighting in the front line of terrorism? As with Congress, the administration has shown no regard for the opinions of senior military, active or retired.

As was the case during the Vietnam conflict, do we retired military stand silent even though we are convinced that we are in the midst of misguided policy that has long-term negative consequences? By giving uncritical endorsement of the policy, we in effect jump into the hole we have dug and help shovel deeper. Or do we believe the American public needs to hear our dissent so they can make a more informed decision? This is not an easy dilemma to solve, but some of us have decided it is patriotic to speak out.

The media, which has a constitutional duty to inform the public and act as the watchdog over the government, shares the dilemma of military officers. Personally, I believe the media in general erred in favor of endorsing government actions that have led this country into a quagmire that has alienated most of the world and squandered the good will that we enjoyed in the aftermath of 9-11.

While some insist that now that we are at war everyone should refrain from criticism, I would argue that such acquiescence is tantamount to aiding and abetting those who refuse to learn from their mistakes. If we as a people - and the media in particular - follow that advice, we surrender our right to live in a democracy.

Who decides when there is a "clear and present danger" that warrants the suspension of constitutional guarantees of freedom of the media and freedom for critics to oppose policy? While the Patriot Act does not go as far as those previous actions, it does have the potential to curb freedom in a way that is disturbing to many. The act is now under review and it will be interesting to see if fundamental changes are made to address those concerns.

The most important lesson I draw from this debate is that our leaders should be careful of how they go about leading the people into war. In the age of instantaneous communication, the truth will come out. When the administration refuses to listen to non-public dissent, some of us will go public. The media must be the watchdog for the public. Don't blame the messenger.

Terrorism: War of Ideas

By John H. Johns, BG, USA Ret.
October 17, 2004

"Terrorism is a tactic used by individuals and organizations to kill and destroy. Our efforts should be directed at those individuals and organizations...long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power..." 9-11 Report

"This war cannot be won militarily. The gun will not win this one. This is a clash of ideas, an information war." General Peter J. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, to Joe Galloway, Knight Ridder reporter.

"Traditionally, victory went to the country whose armies won. But in a global information Age, victory also depends upon whose story wins. In addition to hard military power, we need skill at winning hearts and minds with soft power - the ability to attract others with our values and culture." Joseph S. Nye Jr.

"We actually misnamed the war on terror. It ought to be the struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies who happen to use terror as a weapon to try to shake the conscience of the Free World." George W. Bush, August 2004

"Support for the United States has plummeted. Polls taken in Islamic countries after 9-11 suggested that many or most people thought the United States was doing the right thing in its fight against terrorism; few people saw popular support for Al Qaeda...by 2003, polls showed that 'the bottom has fallen out' of support for America in most of the Muslim world." 9-11 Report

The United States is facing a threat unlike any we have faced in the past. We are sailing uncharted, perilous seas. There are indications that we may not have accurately identified the nature of this threat and may be solving the wrong problem. Indeed, the phrase "War on Terrorism" is a misnomer that could indicate that we are on the wrong path - as President Bush recently acknowledged. As will be discussed below in more detail, terrorism is a means of violence for political ends; the ultimate purpose is to influence political decisions of adversaries. If we focus too narrowly on the violent acts - the symptoms - we will miss the target and exacerbate the problem. Indeed, Secretary Rumsfeld has raised an important question:

"Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?" October 2003

Undoubtedly, recruitment into the terrorist ranks reflects a losing battle for the hearts and minds of the population from which these recruits come, primarily, if not totally, from the Islamic world. The 9-11 Commission Report, cited above, recognizes this fact. Actually, the situation has worsened since the Commission made that observation. A June 2004 Zogby poll taken in Arab States found negative views of the United States as follows: Egypt 98%; Morocco 88%; Saudi Arabia 94%, UAE 73%. The major reasons cited were: unfair foreign policy, e.g., support of Israel and the Iraq war. The same survey showed the most admired people to be: 1) Jacques Chirac; 2) Gamel Nasser, the martyred president of Egypt, 3) Hasan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader; and 4) Sadam Hussein and Osama bin Laden (tie). Other polls show the unfavorable view of the United States exists throughout the world, including Europe.

Some dismiss these negative views of the United States as nothing more than jealousy based on our wealth and power and maintain it has nothing to do with our policies. As Senator Zell Miller said at the Republican National Convention:

"In their warped way of thinking, America is the problem, not the solution. They don't believe there is any real danger in the world except that which America brings on itself through our clumsy and misguided foreign policy."

President Bush describes the problem in rather simple terms. "They hate us because we are free"; it is a war of "good versus evil." At the other extreme, some see it as a "clash of civilizations." Others see it as a religious war that is foreordained by God to end in Armageddon. Others see it in more specific terms commonly associated with historical international conflict. How can we explain these conflicting perceptions when our leaders see terrorism in such stark terms of good and evil? Naturally, people disagree on the nature of the conflict. Men of goodwill and comparable expertise can, and will, disagree on this matter, as you will see in the diverse views expressed in this symposium. I can only do my best to tell it like I see it; however, each of us perceives the complex world through our own perceptual lens and I am not free of this weakness.

"We all carry around with us a big lens, a big framework, through which we look at the world, order events, and decide what is important and what is not." Thomas L. Friedman, Longitudes and Attitudes, 2003, p. 3

The war of ideas that we are engaged in involves a whole range of beliefs about what is right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust. People in all societies tend toward sociocentrism - the belief that their values and culture are the best, whether it is their economic philosophy, political philosophy, social organization, or religious beliefs. This includes a tendency to see the world as "us" and "them" in terms of these values and cultural traits. Moreover, we filter events in the world through the lenses of these belief systems. Most people would like to believe that they look at events through an impartial, objective lens, reflected in the saying that "seeing is believing." Unfortunately, research shows that most people turn this around and the guiding principle becomes "believing is seeing." This is a fundamental truth about how people usually view the world - they interpret events through the lens of preconceived convictions. The aim of objective thinking is to examine critically a situation before forming our beliefs (seeing is believing), but too frequently, we see what reinforces what we already believe (believing is seeing). This tendency is especially dominant when we perceive complex human behavior in which we have a vested interest. That people's definition of reality reflects emotional, individual needs should be obvious. Go to a sporting event, especially a youth event, where the spectators are mostly parents of the participants. Observe how the opposite sides interpret events on the field (e.g., fouls, referee calls). If you are a disinterested observer, you may wonder if the two sides are viewing the same game. Move this phenomenon to political, religious, or economic issues and the dynamics are similar. People perceive the world in incompatible ways, yet they may be ready to die to impose their version of "truth" on the rest of the world. It is important to understand where and how individuals get these perspectives. "Biased" perception is more pronounced when our beliefs about what is "right" and "wrong" regarding these behaviors are based on uncritical faith in the sources of those beliefs. Each of us is a product of our own experiences and thus we bring to a situation our own unique belief system that filters the "real world." Moreover, each of us has convictions that our beliefs are based on solid logic and critical thought - that we are seeing the world as it is, unfiltered through a biased perceptual system. How then, do we know what we know to be true? How confident are we that our most cherished values are true? In the "war of ideas" that will be discussed below, it is important to keep these principles in mind.

What, then, are the basic values and beliefs that frame Americans' view of the world? Let us look at the opening paragraph of the United States National Security Strategy:

"The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom - and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. In the twenty-first century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their future prosperity. People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children - male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society - and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom - loving people across the globe and across the ages." The White House, September 2002

In broad terms, this tells the world that American/Western values are the values that must be adopted throughout the world. These values are sacred to Americans. In fact, it is often considered unpatriotic to question the universality of individualism, pluralistic democracy, and free enterprise. Some have gone so far as to declare that these values represent "the end of history." Francis Fukuyama, then with the State Department, wrote "We may be witnessing the end of history as such; that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government," "The End of History," The National Interest, Summer, 1989). He also included free markets as an end state for economic affairs. As we will see, not all accept this analysis.

There are several dimensions to the war of ideas; they involve economic, environmental, political, and religious beliefs and practices - as well as historical events in the Middle East. These are exceedingly complex and people have sharply differing views about the reality of conditions in the world today, reflecting the "lens" mentioned by Friedman. In a short essay, these complexities can easily be oversimplified. With this caveat, I will do my best to be objective in my approach, but my analysis will be through my unique perceptual filter, as are all analyses.

Samuel P. Huntington provides an excellent summary of the clashing ideas between the Islamic world and the "Western" world in his 1996 book, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order. He discusses the historical, cultural, political, economic, and religious dimensions that make up "civilizations." Those who assume the Western World values and doctrine represent a universal civilization "...generally share beliefs in individualism, market economies, and political democracy..." Many also believe that the spread of Western consumption patterns and popular culture around the world is creating a universal civilization. He rejects the notion that these beliefs are shared outside the West and states, "only naïve arrogance can lead Westerners to assume that non-Westerners will become 'Westernized' by acquiring Western goods."

In regard to the religious dimension, Huntington says:

"Of all the objective elements which define civilizations, the most important usually is religion. To a very large degree, the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world's great religions; and people who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter each other." P.42

Huntington goes on to warn against the resurgence of religious fundamentalism in all religions as a force that threatens world order.

Huntington sees the conflict between the West and Islam as primarily focused on weapons proliferation, human rights and democracy, control of oil, migration, Islamic terrorism, and Western intervention. Above all, he warns against the notion that the West can impose its values on the non-Western world. He says, "...Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers three problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is dangerous." That it is false is the central thesis of his book. It is immoral he says because what would be necessary to bring it about. It is dangerous because it could lead to a major intercivilizational war between core states and it is dangerous to the West because it could lead to the defeat of the West. (Pp. 310-311) In a like manner, George Kennan, in a 1985 article in Foreign Affairs, warned the United States against demanding that the world adopt our version of democracy and economic systems as we understand them. These are not necessarily the future of all mankind, nor is it the duty of the United States to insist that they become that. Moreover, he says, much of our foreign policy is the result of pressures from politically influential special interest elements within the society.

The economic dimension is perhaps the most universal of the issues that leads to discontent that can foster terrorism. Since WWII, the United States has been at the apex of economic well-being. No doubt this has caused envy from around the world. The industrialized world has prospered and has closed the gap considerably. Parts of the "third world," such as China and India, see hope. Other parts of the world have not been so fortunate. There is a widespread view among many people in these areas that wealthy nations, especially the United States, have been morally weak in the control of the global economy. How far a nation goes in considering morality in the conduct of foreign affairs is a difficult boundary to draw, especially in the area of economics. All moral theories include some concept of distributive justice, which includes the distribution of economic benefits. How far does a wealthy nation such as the United States go in sharing its wealth with less fortunate countries? In addition to foreign aid, trade policies affect the distribution of wealth. There is little consensus on what is just and unjust in these matters. Some argue that the duty of government is to meet the needs of its citizens without regard for the fate of others. Here again, one need not chose all or nothing in considering the moral dimension. Most would agree that the "Marshall Plan" at the end of WWII was not only a moral thing to do, but that it was a practical policy that was in the long-term interest of the United States.

Currently, the U.S. ranks at the bottom of industrial nations in the percentage of its GDP that goes to foreign aid. And even that small amount goes largely to two recipients - chosen for their strategic importance rather than on economic need. Critics of U.S. policy also claim that the policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund are dictated by the U.S. and favor the "haves" in the world. Based on "free market" ideology, conditions for economic aid from these agencies require recipient countries to structure their economies in a way that sometimes violates value systems and eliminates social safety nets. Perceptions of economic injustice are a fertile breeding ground for unrest and potential terrorist activity throughout the developing world.

The Middle East is a special case because of its oil resources and the U.S. dependency on that oil. The reader is assumed to be familiar with these circumstances. Suffice it to say that U.S policy toward that region is dictated by the need to have access to oil - as well as our support for Israel (which will be discussed below). One of the rallying cries of bin Laden has been the perceived exploitation of the region by the U.S. Our support of corrupt regimes that keep oil at artificially low prices is viewed by many as economic imperialism. The use of oil wealth to benefit the royal families and ruling elites is seen by many as a by-product of U.S. policies. The fact that the region is Islamic is a contaminating factor, as will be discussed below.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict has to be high on any lists of controversial policies. Depending on which "lens" is used, the most critical issue in the main terrorist threat is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The subject is too complex to cover here, but opinion polls around the world show that the world perceives the U.S. to be biased in providing unqualified support for Israel. U.N. resolutions, e.g., 242 and 338, calling for Israel to return to the 1967 borders, have repeatedly been ignored. In the eyes of most of the world, not only has the U.S. supported the expansion of settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, it has indirectly financed them. This secular foreign policy has now merged with religion. Fundamentalist Christian and Jewish groups have allied to support a "Greater Israel" of biblical prophecy. Jerry Falwell has called the Prophet Mohammed a "terrorist"; Pat Robertson called him a "wild-eyed Fanatic, robber, and brigand." Franklin Graham branded Islam "evil." These fundamentalists call for the "Greater Israel" so that biblical prophecy can be fulfilled to prepare for the "Second Coming."

Some in the current administration seem to endorse the concept of a "Greater Israel." Secretary Rumsfeld declared that he was tired of hearing about the so-called "occupied West Bank," asserting that it belonged to Israel. Tom Delay, the de facto leader of the House of Representatives, refers to Judea and Samaria and says they are Israel's. He told a Texas Baptist audience that God had made George Bush president to "promote a biblical worldview." From his own admission, Bush is a fundamentalist and some believe he holds these views.

Thomas Friedman, noted author and widely acknowledged expert on Middle East affairs, has this to say:

"American Jewish leaders, fundamentalist Christians, and neo-conservatives together have helped make it impossible for anyone in the U.S. government to talk seriously about halting Israeli settlement-building without being accused of being anti-Israel. Their collaboration has helped prolong a colonial Israel occupation that now threatens the entire Zionist enterprise.

"Either leaders of goodwill get together and acknowledge that Israel can't stay in the territories, but can't just pack up and leave without a U.S.-NATO force helping Palestinians oversee their state, or Osama wins - and the war of civilizations will be coming to a theater near You." Longitudes and Attitudes, p.151

I conducted a one-week seminar in Muscat, Oman in November 2001 for the senior officers of the Omani Royal Air Force. The commander said to me when I arrived, "when will the United States start asking why instead of who?" During the discussion of international terrorism, I asked the officers about bin Laden, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah. They universally condemned bin Laden and the Taliban; they considered the others as "freedom fighters." They estimated that maybe ten percent of Muslims supported Al Qaeda, and most of that support would vanish if the U.S. would force Israel to implement U.N. Resolution 242, which calls for return to the 1967 borders. Obviously this is not a scientific survey, but it corresponds to credible surveys that have been conducted. They emphasized that it would be a mistake to lump all "terrorists" together, since one person's terrorist, e.g., Hamas, is another person's "freedom fighter."

The Iraq war is another issue that creates resentment throughout the world. Surveys show that the only populations that support the war are the American and Israeli people. That support is on the wane in the United States. Even before the recent war, the U.S. policy toward Iraq was controversial. The economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations - at the urging of the United States - have been widely perceived to be unjust. Some estimates indicate some 500,000 people have died because of these sanctions. Osama bin Laden has cited the sanctions, and the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, as prime motivations in his hatred of the United States. The fact that people in the region admire Saddam Hussein is cause for reflection. Surveys in Europe show that the majority of people view the United States, Israel, and North Korea as the primary threats to world peace. This is even more disturbing.

The 9-11 Commission correctly recognizes that terrorism is a form of violence used by individuals and groups for political goals. The first hurdle in coping with terrorism is coming to a consensus on a definition. The simple solution is to define all terrorism and counter-terrorism in moral terms of good against evil, but this does not do justice to the complexity of the phenomenon. In the most general sense, terrorism can be defined as "the use of violence against a non-combatant civilian target when the intended effect is the psychological impact on a wider audience in order to achieve political goals." In the past, different agencies of the U.S. have used approximations of this definition. If one accepts this definition, the carpet-bombing of cities in WWII, by both sides, can be classified as terrorist acts. All participants in WWII used such measures. They were routinely morally justified as avoiding greater violence. The use of atomic bombs on Japan was, in fact, deliberately designed to terrorize the Japanese into surrendering. President Truman's diary and the planning minutes attest to this. Undoubtedly, the atomic attacks avoided the costly invasion of Japan, which most analysts agree would have resulted in millions of deaths, both civilian and military. Before development of the atomic weapons, plans existed to use chemical weapons on civilian targets that would kill millions. The same rationale was used to justify their use. Thus, we considered a range of "Weapons of Mass Destruction" to terrorize the Japanese, all morally justified in our eyes.

The rationale that the greater good is served by terrorism may in fact suffice as a moral justification of the acts, but it does so by arguing that the ends justify the means. Some ethicists reject the notion that ends can justify means when the act in itself is immoral. This is not universal, however, and experience shows that most people often justify acts that are immoral per se, but where the consequences of the act can justify it. Thus it becomes a decision calculus that weighs the pros and cons to determine if the consequences can be shown to further a "just cause." Those who bomb civilian targets, as well as those who justify the use of weapons of mass destruction, follow this reasoning. Terrorists who use specific civilian targets, including assassinations, use this rationale for moral justification. This includes suicide bombers.

If a belligerent wishes to brand acts of terrorism against it as immoral, it must find a definition that distinguishes the type of terrorism used by it and its allies from that of its adversaries. In the case of the current "war against terrorism," declared by President Bush, this presents problems. It is useful to rally the American people by stating the effort in moralistic terms of good versus evil and rejecting any suggestion that terrorism is any way morally justified. Another way to isolate the Islamic terrorists is to define terrorism to exclude actions of nations or their military. Recent definitions by U.S. Government Agencies in fact offer such definitions, restricting the label to non-nation activity. This has the convenience of putting our use of military force outside the bounds of terrorism. This restricted definition, of course, denies legitimacy to the only means of violence available to the weak and takes away the reciprocal advantage. Terrorism is the force of choice for domestic dissidents and the militarily weak in international affairs because it gives them an asymmetrical advantage, especially if they cannot be readily identified. Non-nation groups conduct much of international terrorism such as the 9-11 acts. While they may have the support of governments, these connections are difficult to prove. This limits the counter-terrorist efforts because over reaction against broad targets can generate more hostility and lose moral legitimacy for the counter terrorism effort. More will be said on this regarding the Iraq war.

Word-smithing to exclude one side's use of terrorism may appeal to the militarily powerful and their followers, but non-nation terrorist groups may argue that the ends justify the means if their terrorist acts result in a change in policies that they label as unjust. Moreover, the current enemies of the United States may argue that U.S. policies themselves involve a form of economic and military terrorism - economic sanctions against Iraq from 1991 to the recent invasion, sanctions against Cuba, etc. and militarily against the Palestinians (through Israel as a proxy), Nicaragua, etc. It all depends on whose ox is being gored; one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. Surveys consistently show that much of the Islamic world views terrorists against Israel as "freedom fighters." President Reagan labeled the Islamic terrorists fighting the Russians in Afghanistan in the 80s (including the Taliban, a member of which was Osama bin Laden) as "freedom fighters." They are now "terrorists." Again, it depends on whose ox is being gored.

In all conflicts, each side is convinced of its moral high ground. It then becomes a contest for convincing target audiences that you have the moral high ground. In the current war, the audiences include the American public, the populations in which the enemy operates, and the world community. Thus, the task in the current "war on terrorism" is to convince these target audiences that ours is the moral and just cause. In order to keep support among the populations in which they operate and draw their recruits, the terrorists will have to win the moral argument. The evidence so far is that the terrorists are winning except in the United States and Israel.

It should be clear to the reader that the central theme of this essay is that victory in the "war on terrorism" will be achieved only if we win the hearts and minds of several target audiences. To date, we appear to be losing that battle among some audiences. A crucial question is: are we losing the battle because of our failure to communicate effectively, or must we reexamine some of our policies? This question is best answered by looking at specific target audiences. In doing this, we must keep in mind that borders between these audiences are porous. Unlike wars of the past, where nations could more or less separate these audiences, what is said to one audience is likely to be available to the others. The message that appeals to one may alienate another. Truly, this is the age of global communications.

The domestic target is critical. The greatest strength of any group is not its military might, but its will to make sacrifices and cope with adversity, often referred to as morale, esprit, or national will. Research shows such cohesiveness depends on several factors: leadership, a sense of equity, trend of recent experiences, and crises generated by external threats are among the most important. In the aftermath of 9-11, the American public was in a state of shock. This was the crisis that galvanized the people. They looked for a concrete target against which they could retaliate. By and large, this was left to the leader - the President - to define. Polls showed that the people were ready to follow his leadership. When it was determined that al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were responsible, the people gave overwhelming support to retaliate with whatever force was deemed necessary. The president had the complete trust of the vast majority of the public. Surveys showed that support and trust extended throughout the world, including the Islamic world. This carried into the war in Afghanistan, where the Taliban refused to hand over bin Laden. A reluctant Pakistan, which had helped put the Taliban in power in the 1980s (with the support of the United States), provided critical support for this effort.

The President then made the case to the American people that Iraq was a central player in the terrorism that had struck us, and was capable of, and intent on, providing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to bin Laden. He persuaded Congress to pass a resolution to authorize force if Saddam did not allow weapons inspectors to verify that Iraq had no such WMDs. The United Nations endorsed that resolution and sent an inspection team into Iraq. The UN resolution specified that if the Iraqi government were in a material breach of that resolution, that is, if Saddam refused to allow the inspections, it (the UN) would authorize the use of force. In early 2003, the United States declared that Iraq was in material breach. They made the case to the UN, but were unable to get a resolution to use force. President Bush went to war without the UN resolution. He claimed the first resolution gave the U.S. that authority; most of the rest of the world, including major allies, disagreed. Thus, we went to war without legitimacy conferred by the world community. Rightly or wrongly, the United Nations is the institution that can best confer such legitimacy.

Polls showed that 77% of the American public supported Bush's decision to go to war. Morale was high as the military phase went quickly. The trend of recent experience was good. The president's ratings were extremely high. However, events in Iraq have not gone as predicted by the administration. No significant amounts of weapons of WMDs have been found and ties to al Qaeda have been found to be dubious at best. The torture scandals dealt a deadly blow to our moral standing in the world. In short, the occupation has not gone well, i.e., the trend is bad. (As mentioned earlier in this paper, people have different views on this. Some claim events in Iraq are very positive). Approximately 50% of the American public now believes the war was justified. While the majority of Americans still believe the president is handling the war on terrorism well, support has eroded.

Rationale for the war has shifted to the theme that Saddam was an evil man that needed to be removed. This "moralistic" theme has been fairly effective with certain segments of the population, but has received increased criticism as casualties and costs have mounted. Fast, few-casualty wars, such as the 1991 Gulf War, are popular and good for morale. Quagmires, such as Vietnam, are not. The jury is out on how long the administration will be able to maintain the necessary support of the American public. Moralism sells to the domestic audience; it sells less well to the rest of the world.

"We must be careful about what might be called the histrionics of moralism at the expense of its substance. By that is meant the projection of attitudes, poses, and rhetoric that cause us to appear noble and altruistic in the mirror of our own vanity, but lack substance when related to the realities of international life." George Kennan, "Morality in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs, 1985

Another factor in the eroding support is the question of equity in the sacrifices being made in Iraq. Criticism has surfaced regarding the composition of the military, i.e., that it comes disproportionably from the poor and minority segments of the population. Similarly, the reliance on the Reserves and National Guard has come under attack, as has the "stop loss" policies and recall of retirees. While rational arguments can be made that these are unjustified criticisms, the fact is that they are factors that must be considered.

The support of the American people will depend in a large measure on the belief that the sacrifices being made are indeed necessary to protect them from a threat. The polls show that the president has lost some credibility in that regard, largely due to the Iraq war. I have no suggestions for changing the message to the domestic audience unless things turn for the better in Iraq. That, I suspect, will occur only if we are able to enlist the assistance of the wider world community in the effort in Iraq and/or the situation in Iraq improves dramatically. So far, the administration has not been successful in enlisting significant support from major nations who have the resources to make significant contributions. In the absence of such support, or dramatic progress in the stability in Iraq, we are faced with a Hobbesean choice. We can stay in Iraq indefinitely, with the continuing consequences of alienating most of the world and eroding support among the American public, or declare victory, pull out, and leave the situation to evolve in whatever fashion unforeseen forces dictate. Both alternatives have dire consequences for the war on terrorism. Further elaboration of these choices is too complex to address in this essay.

Islamic extremists are not going to be persuaded by words. Moreover, they will not be mollified by policy changes. Even if we were able to settle the Israeli-Palestinian issue, withdraw all forces from the Middle East, allow them to establish Islamic Theocracies throughout the region, etc., this would not abate their implacable hatred for the United States. The only way to deal with this element is to shrink its support base, isolate it, and eliminate it. Unfortunately, the extremists have metastasized into splinter groups spread around the world. The task is becoming more difficult. The longer we lose the war of ideas the harder this task will be.

Islamic moderates are a crucial target audience. Immediately after 9-11, there was apparently a great deal of sympathy for the United States and little support for al Qaeda. This attitude has shifted dramatically since the Iraq war (see quotes of the 9-11 Report, cited above). Unfortunately, the conflict of ideas between the Islamic world and the United States and its coalition partners, has evolved more and more into a conflict of religions. If this continues on its path, it will be difficult to reverse. The president initially used some unfortunate terms such as "crusade" to define the conflict. This evoked some deep-seated memories among Muslims. Compounding this problem are the inflammatory statements of some of the leaders of Christian fundamentalists, cited above. Bush also reduced the problem to simplistic terms of "you are either with us or against us" and "all terrorism is evil." This sells well to the American audience; it does not to the rest of the world. When this is intertwined with the Palestinian issue, it is a volatile mix (see above). The fact that Bush emphasizes his fundamentalist beliefs compounds the problem. Our perceived bias toward Israel's security as opposed to justice for the Palestinians - by both political parties - is an obstacle. There is little likelihood this will change, however (see Friedman comments, above), so we will have to live with that and pay the price.

We need to diffuse this trend toward polarization of the Islamic world on one side and Christian and Jewish fundamentalists on the other. This trend is pushing moderate Muslims into the radical base from which the terrorist organizations are drawing support - both recruits and sympathy. I don't believe this is going to be accomplished by improved propaganda techniques or restructuring of our television and radio organizations. Nor will it be accomplished by exporting democracy and market economies, as the administration seems to believe. Rather, this will require a reexamination of our entire foreign policy toward the Middle East.

The world community is also a critical target audience. My thesis is that we can only succeed in the war against terrorism if it is a coordinated international effort. This administration has alienated much of the world by its go-it-alone policies. It has shown outright contempt for allies and international institutions that do not uncritically support the United States. In a more general sense, this includes our rejection of protocols on such issues as global warming, international courts, and law of the seas. The National Security Strategy announced in 2002, which some critics have labeled Pax Americana, is manifest in the war in Iraq, and lends credence to the perception that we have contempt for international institutions. Policies that do not have international legitimacy may satisfy the public's jingoistic, chauvinistic sentiments, but they do not serve our long-term interests. The people applauded when President Bush said, "if no one joins us, we will go it alone...after all, this is America." Those who dissent are called unpatriotic at best, and often labeled as traitors. While there has been some shift in rhetoric regarding the UN, the address by Bush on 21 September 2004 showed no fundamental change in his attitude toward that organization.

It has become popular in some circles to dismiss the United Nations and other international institutions as debating societies that serve irresponsible demands of Third World countries. Admittedly, working toward international moral order based on shared values requires a great deal of patience. However, we cannot expect to have our way on every issue. It is difficult to achieve agreement on other than abstract values and rules that lend themselves to a wide variety of interpretations, but the effectiveness of these moral concepts depends to a large measure on the voluntary response to world opinion, usually expressed through the international institutions involved. Few of these institutions have the ability to enforce their judgments. In the case of the U.N., the Security Council must take action if a resolution is to have teeth, and each of the five permanent members has veto authority. When one of these permanent members vetoes a resolution passed overwhelmingly by the body, it implies a rejection of moral consensus. Used sparingly when one's vital interests are involved is understandable; flagrant use reflects disdain for multilateral approaches to world order and an arrogance of power. By its repeated flouting of world opinion, the United States has gained the reputation of being arrogant.

Winning the protracted war on terrorism will require national cohesion and a willingness to make sacrifices for years to come. And yet we are a deeply divided nation in regard to how best to wage the war against extremist individuals and groups who have no apparent limits on the use of terrorism. While some look for the answer in more use of military force, it comes down to a "war of ideas," which we now appear to be losing. More extensive and sophisticated communication techniques will not solve the problem unless we face up to the reasons why the hatred is so intense. Some reasons may be illegitimate or contrary to our national interests. Other factors are amenable to change, though some will be politically difficult.

It will take courageous statesmen in leadership positions to make some of the necessary changes, since the current political climate in the United States is inclined toward jingoistic, self-righteous, moralistic, unilateral solutions. Ideological rigidity that favors unilateralism and pre-emptive wars without regard to international opinion, mixed with religious fundamentalism will be a big hurdle. We need to use more "soft power," as Joseph Nye and Samuel Huntington have suggested. The time to strengthen international moral order is when one is on top. Henry Kissinger comments at the end of his book, Does America Need a Foreign Policy: "America's ultimate challenge is to transfer its power into a moral consensus, promoting its values not by imposition, but by their willing acceptance." In his classic article "Morality in Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, 1985, George Kennan warned the United States against demanding that the world adopt our version of democracy and economic systems as we understand them. He says these are not necessarily the future of all mankind, nor is it the duty of the United States to insist that they become that.

How important is it to have legitimacy in the eyes of the world community? An article in the Ethics and International Affairs (Vol. 9, 1995) was titled "The United Nations and Global Security: The Norm is Mightier Than the Sword." In essence, the author concludes that working through international institutions is more effective in the long term than the use of force. A similar point was made by another article in the same publication, "Beyond Coalitions of the Willing: Assessing U.S. Multilateralism" (Vol. 17, 2003).

Vice President Cheney appeals to American hubris and jingoism when he declares "we will not ask for a permission slip from the UN to protect our interests." Clearly, the Bush administration places little weight on the value of the United Nations when it comes to moral legitimacy. He seems to believe that self-righteous moralizing will accomplish the goal. The majority of the American public seems to buy his rhetoric; the rest of the world does not. The choice of working through international institutions or "going it alone" is a stark choice. The American people have a choice on 2 November as to which road they want to take. Polls show the majority lean to Cheney's position. This is a decision with long-term consequences because four more years on this path will likely make it impossible to reverse course.

• Make a Donation
• Take Action
• Meet Our Candidates
• Join Us

Latest From Our Blog

Please join us!

Join Our Community

Eye on Congress