Originally published in Foreign Policy in Focus on July 17, 2008  In the tit-for-tat, he-said she-said world of modern presidential campaigns, it is rare for a candidate to ask Americans to take a step back and think strategically about the national security problems facing the United States. This week, however, Barack Obama did exactly that, offering the strongest evidence yet that he is a more capable strategic thinker than John McCain.

In a wide-ranging foreign policy speech on Tuesday, Obama took a giant leap toward institutionalizing his long-running commitment to end the war in Iraq. In the key portion of his remarks, Obama said:

At some point, a judgment must be made. Iraq is not going to be a perfect place, and we don’t have unlimited resources to try to make it one. We are not going to kill every al Qaeda sympathizer, eliminate every trace of Iranian influence, or stand up a flawless democracy before we leave – General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker acknowledged this to me when they testified last April. That is why the accusation of surrender is false rhetoric used to justify a failed policy. In fact, true success in Iraq – victory in Iraq – will not take place in a surrender ceremony where an enemy lays down their arms. True success will take place when we leave Iraq to a government that is taking responsibility for its future – a government that prevents sectarian conflict, and ensures that the al Qaeda threat which has been beaten back by our troops does not reemerge. That is an achievable goal if we pursue a comprehensive plan to press the Iraqis stand up.

Obama is offering concrete objectives for the United States in Iraq, along with a realistic vision for what the endgame might look like. As he said, there is never going to be any kind of “surrender ceremony,” regardless of how often John McCain tosses around politically-charged words like “defeat” and “retreat.”

Obama went on from there to discuss his plans for winding down the war, including his willingness to “make tactical adjustments as we implement this strategy” and “consult with commanders on the ground and the Iraqi government.” This willingness to refine his policies means that Obama could actually bring most U.S. combat brigades home sooner than the 16 months he has estimated it will take, if accelerated withdrawal was determined to be an acceptable course of action.

Finally, Obama reiterated his plan to leave residual U.S. forces in Iraq in order to perform specific missions, such as targeted strikes against Al Qaeda, protecting American diplomats, and training Iraqi Security Forces. This concept of an “over-the-horizon” residual force in Iraq has been a staple of Democratic proposals for years now. Senators Russ Feingold of Wisconsin and Carl Levin of Michigan have repeatedly included residual forces in their legislative proposals to end the war. Some military experts question the wisdom of a residual presence, however, because they argue that a small number of U.S. soldiers in Iraq will be attractive targets for insurgents.

Forced to respond to his rival’s major address, McCain chose to criticize Obama for articulating his Iraq strategy before his scheduled trip to the country this summer. “In my experience, fact-finding missions usually work best the other way around: First you assess the facts on the ground, then you present a new strategy,” McCain said. McCain apparently thinks his trip to Iraq last year – where 100 soldiers in armored Humvees redirected traffic so McCain could be escorted around a Baghdad market in a bullet-proof vest while attack helicopters circled overhead – is a realistic way to assess the facts on the ground.

In response to another question on Tuesday, McCain said, “Today we know Sen. Obama was wrong. The ‘surge’ has succeeded.” This short sentiment, which could perhaps be translated as “Mission Accomplished for The Surge,” constitutes McCain’s favorite talking point on the war. It also clearly demonstrates McCain’s ongoing conflation of military tactics with military strategy.

General David Petraeus’s tactical adjustments have enabled U.S. troops to reduce violence in targeted geographical areas of Iraq. However, limited military management will never lead to the type of World War II-style “victory” bandied about in our political discourse. Short of permanently occupying or totally destroying and rebuilding Iraq, as was the case in Germany, Japan, and South Korea – examples McCain frequently offers as models – America’s ability to construct an oasis of democracy in the Middle East at the butt of a gun is a mirage.

Political events in Iraq continue to possess an internal momentum that the United States is unable to definitively influence. Kurdish lawmakers this week walked out of the Iraqi Parliament to protest a draft provincial election law. Sunnis, who boycotted the 2005 elections, are still isolated from the decision-making process, which makes reform efforts impossible because the elected Parliament is not currently representative. American calls for the passage of key pieces of legislation have gone mostly unmet, with Iraqi lawmakers content to operate on Baghdad’s clock, not Washington’s. The referendum over the status of Kirkuk has been repeatedly postponed due to intractable differences between the contending parties’ bargaining positions.

Most ominously, the predominately Sunni sahwa movement, known as the “Sons of Iraq,” is having its integration into the regular Iraqi Security Forces delayed or ignored by the Shiite-dominated central government. This has led to frustration in the sahwas, and may soon lead members to conclude that the $300 dollars a month paid by the United States just isn’t worth it. The loss of cooperation with the sahwas – isolated, angry, and 90,000 strong – would leave a disgruntled and well-armed Sunni army in place ready to fight its Shiite enemies.

What McCain doesn’t seem to understand, but Obama clearly does, is that the United States must not allow a divided Iraqi government to determine the timetable for U.S. withdrawal. The President must do what is in the best interests of the United States and make the difficult strategic choices, not hide behind commanders like General Petraeus and defer to them on key decisions. Doing so is a subversion of civilian control of the military, a time-honored principle in American government.

The purpose of the surge, as President Bush said, was to provide breathing space for Iraqis to achieve political reconciliation. Tactical military successes under the surge are to be applauded, but political results are the ultimate objective. Lacking political progress, the United States is simply surging to nowhere.

Iraqi hearts and minds have never been with the United States, and they will never be, no matter how many troops we commit or sahwa movements we fund. Iraqis must develop an allegiance to a representative government capable of compromising to achieve political reconciliation. As long as U.S. forces remain in the country, Iraqis will remain focused on expelling the occupier, not developing allegiance to their government.

Barack Obama demonstrated this week that he is thinking several moves ahead on the chessboard in Iraq. John McCain seems content to remind us how great he is at checkers.

Travis Sharp is the Military Policy Analyst at the Council for a Livable World in Washington, D.C. and is an analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus.

July 14, 2008.   In a campaign that features back and forth on issues large and small, where Barack Obama and John McCain disagree on everything from taxes to offshore drilling to Social Security to Iraq, it is amazing how much agreement there is …

In August 2007, Council for a Livable World submitted seven critical questions on national security issues to all declared presidential candidates from both parties. At the time, that list included Sen. Joseph Biden, now the presumptive Democratic Vice…

Originally posted on Experience Advocacy August 21, 2008 by David Cohen.  
Senator Lieberman’s descent into political isolation will come after the election if the Democrats have at least 52 seats, no matter who is President. Lieberman has to pay a political price in the Senate for his endorsement of John McCain for President.

As a participant in successful efforts to strip House Democrats who supported Goldwater in 1964 of seniority, and strip three unfair and arbritrary Committee Chairmen of their posts after the House Democratic landslide in 1974 (post-Watergate), I can attest to the precise reasons for stripping legislators of their chairmanships and seniority.

Lieberman’s views on the Iraq war and his Iran bellicosity are not reasons. Even his outrageous connection with Reverend Hagee does not per se sink Lieberman. Even McCain rejected Hagee’s endorsement after his anti-Catholic comments. Hagee’s tepid apology to Catholics does not reduce the virulence of his essential bigotry. Lieberman’s occassional liberalism (pro-choice, opposition to Alito’s confirmation, his leadership on global warming and DC’s rights to vote and to representation in the House) do not mitigate his actions in support of McCain for President.

Where Lieberman has reached the point of no return is his endorsement of McCain for President. This alone puts Lieberman over the line. His active campaigning for McCain serves to emphasize Lieberman’s endorsement. To speak at the Republican convention serves to remind the rest of us that Lieberman will soon be as forgotten as was Zell Miller, the Georgia Democratic Senator who spoke at the Republican convention in 2004 in support of Bush over Kerry.

Lieberman wants to save his Chairmanship. So he has contributed $100,000 from his political fund to elect Senate Democrats. He is trying to buy his way out of a mortal political sin. No sale, Lieberman. That money, and even future money, does not forgive his support of McCain for President. The people of Connecticut can elect whomever they choose. That does not mean that official is entitled to the benefits of the Democratic caucus. That is what House Democrats established in 1964 and 1974. Senate Democrats should follow suit.

True, right now Lieberman has a whip hand. If he leaves the caucus and votes with the Republicans to organize the Senate, Cheney breaks a 50-50 tie. That would mean Lieberman will have broken his unambiguous pledge to Connecticut voters that he would vote with the Democrats to organize the Senate. To break the pledge would make Lieberman’s legacy that of a liar or a Benedict Arnold.

Next year, hopefully, there will a different scenario. If Democrats reach the magic number of 52, Lieberman should be treated as Wayne Morse was when he supported, as a Republican, Stevenson over Eisenhower in 1952. Lieberman would lose his Committee Chairmanship (Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs), and all Committee assignments from the Senate Democrats. If Republicans wanted to give him Committee assignments, that would be the Republican Conference’s decision. Otherwise, he would get last choice and go to the bottom of the list.

Will Senate Democrats pass the easy test of disciplining Lieberman? That’s far from clear. They are likely to have to be shamed into exercising their basic party responsibilities.

David Cohen is the Senior Congressional Fellow at Council for a Livable World.

In the next couple of weeks, the House of Representatives may consider H.Con.Res. 362, a non-binding resolution on Iran. H.Con.Res. 362 is the latest in a series of provocative and counter-productive Congressional initiatives on Iran.

Council for a Livable World joins other organizations in urging Members of Congress not to co-sponsor this provocative measure and to vote “No” on H.Con.Res. 362 if it comes to a vote.

* This resolution reprises and magnifies the Bush Administration’s longstanding sticks-and-saber-rattling-and-no-carrots approach to dealing with Iran – an approach that is increasingly recognized even by senior U.S. intelligence and military officials as inadequate and unconstructive.

Worse still, H. Con. Res. 362 risks reinforcing the most reckless tendencies of those in the Bush administration who have not yet given up on the idea of striking Iran militarily before leaving office.

The sanctions demanded in H. Con. Res. 362 go far beyond existing sanctions and previously proposed sanctions for dealing with Iran. The impact of these additional sanctions would be to undermine any chance for diplomacy to succeed in achieving a negotiated resolution to all of the outstanding issues between the U.S. and Iran.

* For example, H. Con. Res. 362 demands that the president initiate an international effort “prohibiting the international movement of all Iranian officials not involved in negotiating the suspension of Iran’s nuclear program.” Implementation of such a measure would decrease chances of persuading Iran to come to the negotiating table and make impossible the kind of discreet, preparatory contacts that could help build confidence. Such a measure would also undermine efforts to resume U.S.-Iran talks in Baghdad over Iraq security.

* Furthermore, H. Con. Res. 362 contains a mixed message – on the one hand stating that it should not be construed as authorizing the use of force against Iran, and on the other demanding that the President impose harsh sanctions that would be difficult if not impossible to implement outside the context of using force. This mixed message, even if unintentional, is irresponsible; in the event that the Administration does eventually try to impose a naval or air blockade on Iran, members of Congress who support H. Con. Res. 362 risk being viewed as having approved this option in advance.

The resolution thus risks sending a message to the Bush administration and the world that Congress supports a more belligerent policy toward, and, potentially, belligerent actions against, Iran.

Perversely, H. Con. Res. 362 completely fails to acknowledge the November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, which found that Iran had abandoned its covert nuclear weapons program in 2003. It also ignores the findings of International Atomic Energy Agency Director Mohammed ElBaradei, who has consistently said there is no evidence of diversion of nuclear materials for a nuclear weapons program.

* Likewise, H. Con. Res. 362 fails to reflect a key finding of the November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, which concluded that “some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might – if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible – prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program.”

Sanctions alone are of limited use and cannot replace diplomacy as the sole means for resolving the outstanding issues between the U.S. and Iran. Before pushing for another new round of sanctions against Iran, Congress should urge the President to pursue diplomacy without preconditions, a policy that has not even been tried.

Prominent Iranian intellectuals, academics, dissidents and human rights defenders, many of whom have suffered increasing arrests and prosecutions, have urged the U.S. to stop threatening Iran and enter into direct negotiations to resolve the crisis. Congress should listen.

* Clearly, there are serious outstanding questions and concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The best way to resolve these questions would be for the U.S. to drop preconditions and enter into direct, comprehensive, bilateral talks with Iran.